Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
In the case of kevalajñāna it may be admitted that all things reflect into the soul without any via media; or they are illumined by the soul simultaneously. But the stage of mere reflection or illumination does not constitute knowledge. The knowledge begins when particular objects are conceived discriminately. This conception is not possible without some organ which takes into consideration the individual cases in succession.
We can put the same problem in another way. The process of knowledge has two actions related to two different agents. In the stage of stimulation the objects are agents and the senses are passive receivers. The second stage is a response the stimulation caused by the first stage. Here, the agent is mind or soul, The simultaneous stimulation by many objects is possible as it has many agents. But the simultaneous action of mind on all the objects is not possible, as in this case the agent is one. It must act gradually. Of course; when the agent contains a huge body and can cover many units of space simultaneously, it can act upon many things simultaneously, but the Jainas cannot hold that view; because their soul has a limited size.
If the Jaina conception of knowledge, in the case of kevala, is limited to mere stimulation, without reaching the stage of discrimination, as the instance of the sun leads to, it is understandable. But it would mean that kevala is without any kalpanā (articulation) as the Buddhists hold regarding their perception. If the discrimination also is within the range of kevala, it cannot be explained without mind.
The Jainas give one explanation that according to Buddhism, only the thing in itself is existent. The discriminations of name, class etc. are merely conceptual. They do not exist externally. But, according to Jainism nothing is merely conceptual. Every concept has a corresponding external existence. In kevala, as in the case of other cognition, the concepts also reflect as good as the solid objects. In the case of limited cognition the operating organ, i. c. mind has a limited capacity.