Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 122

The General Conception of Knowledge
97
refuted on the following grounds :
(a) If there is no cognizer separate from the senses the cognition should disappear with disappearance of the senses. But, the cognition does not disappear even when the eyes are closed. It lasts in the form of a concept.
(b) Secondly, even when the senses and the object are in close contiguity the cognition does not occur if the mind is absent. During sleep, our sense of touch is already in contact with the bed, but its softness is not experienced.
(c) Thirdly, all the senses have their limited sphere of objectivity. The eye cannot go beyond the colour or form. The nose is limited to smell only, and so on. There must be some organ which coordinates the findings of different senses. In some cases we examine the same thing with different senses and then come to a decision. This function of coordination cannot be performed by the senses individually or collectively, It postulates a separate principle which is nothing but the 50ul.
(4) Another school holds mind or Buddhi as the cause of consciousness. We shall discuss it with the system of Sankhya.
The above discussion is related with the ontological position of consciousness as held by the Cārvāka. Regarding his specific theory of the psychology of feeling, willing or knowing no material is available. Tattvopaplava Simha is the only available work related with that system. But it is mainly confined to criticism of the logic of other systems. It does not explain its own conceptions.
The Nyāya and Vaišesika
The Nature of Soul :
The Nyāya? and Vaišeşika2 systems go one step further
1. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10 2. Vaiśesikasūtra 3.2.4