Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
tion regarding appearance is confined to the pratyakṣa on one side and other types on the other.
There are different theories also regarding the supreme validity in case of disagreement. The Nyāya gives more importance to inference and holds that in case of dispute inference is more raliable than perception or other sources. The Mimāisā attributes ultimate authority to the Vedic texts in case of any dispute. But that authority is confined to the field of ethics only, where other sources have no approach. The Vedānta also is more emphatic on the teaching of Upanisads regarding the conception of transcendental reality. Regarding the discursive knowledge it follows the Bhatta. The Sārkhya attaches equal importance to all of them. As a matter of fact there cannot be any difference between findings of two sources of knowledge, if they are free from fault. The question of comparative reliability arises in the cases of discussion between two opponents. In such cases, generally inference is followed; if the disputants are not followers of the same scriptures. If they are, the testimony is supreme,
The Buddhist has an altogether new basis for his division. He looks towards the object rather than the cause. He divides knowledge into pratyakṣa and anumāna enly. Pratyaksa is perceptual and anumāna is conceptual. There are two types of objects : Svalakşaņa (thing-in-itself) and Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (thing as understood). The thing-in-itself is devoid of all concepts of name and class; and the same is the object of perception. All the conceptual knowledge, is inferential. Thus, the Buddhist holds two types of knowledge according to the two types of object. The other varieties of imperceptual knowledge, as accepted by the Vedic systems, do not differ from inference as far as their subject matter is concerned. According to the Nyāya and other systems the same object can be apprehended by two or more sources. Vātsyāyana proposes abhisamplava (possibility of apprehension of the same object through many i Nyāyabindu p, 21 and 24.