Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. which is clearly, a a knowledge of particularity.
It can be argued that the cognition of sound as sound is Avagraha and not Avāya, because, in the stage of Avāya we go a step further towards particularity. In that stage we cognize the particulars also whether the sound emanates from a horn or conch. Thus, the difference between the two lies in degree of awareness and not quality.
Jinabhadral replies, if the above classification is based on degree only, there cannot be any limit of it. If the decision of sound as belonging to conch is admitted as Avāya, what about the further particulars. We go further and decide that the sound is sweet and not harsh. Further, it is coming from North and not from the South. Either we shall have to fix other classes for these particulars or admit the preceding stages as avagraha in relation to the succeeding ones. This will render the whole classification an anamoly.
Further, the decision of 'this is sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. This exclusion is not possible without the speculation of two sides. It necessitates the existence of Ihā (speculation) before reaching the above decision. Speculation is not possible unless a thing, at first, is apprehended in a general way, and this general apprehension must be admitted as free from all particularity. Otherwise, it also will have an Ihā and a general apprehension as the preceding stages. We cannot say this general apprehension as Vyañjanāvagraha as it is related with the four senses only, and is confined to the function of mere senses. Consequently, we have to admit arthāvagraha as a general apprehension of the type stated above.
Further, arthāvagraha is admitted as lasting for a moment only. The decision of this is sound' can last as long as the further investigations are not carried. It is only the cognition of generality without any particularity that lasts only for a moment, as the cognition of particularity begins from the very next moment, 1. Višeşāvaśyaka Bhāşya 255