Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 54

History and Sources
29
also. Such things cannot make a person reliable. The criterion of an āpta is this, that his views are not contradicted by reason or authority, 1 The absence of contradiction is further ascertained through the fact that his words do not go against the established facts. The preachers of nor-Jaina systems are not āpta because their views are contradicted by the established facts.
Samantabhadra also, like Siddhasena, places all the three sources of knowledge on the same footing. He holds that the reason, the experience and the authority possess the same amount of validity.' Thus, he rejects the views of the Nyāya, the Cārvāka and the Mimāṁsā systems which attach more importance to reason, experience and the authority respectively. He fixes the premises of reason where the speaker is not a reliable person and a thing is established through the sign (hetu) only. On the other hand, where the speaker is reliable and a thing is established on the ground of his words only, it is the premises of āgama. 4 Thus, Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, though great logicians, do not recognise tarka as the ultimate authority in all matters. Like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra also devotes his work of the establishment of non-absolutism. He is very emphatic on Syādvāda, the theory of relative existence.
Though he has not written any independent work on logic or epistemology; yet his occasional remarks are a valuable guide to the future logicians.
We can sum up the contribution of Samantabhadra in the following points :
(1) He fixed the nature of Syādvāda and Saptabhangi, which are the essence of Jaina pbilosophy; and showed their applicability to all the scholastic controversies. 1. Aptamīmāṁsā 6 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 76-77 4. Ibid., 78