Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 116

The General Conception of Knowledge
91
into the physical body. Though individual elements do not consist of that power; yet, their combination does; just as a peculiar mixture of certain herbs produces the power of intoxication, or the mixture of white and yellow produces red colour. This conception of the materialist is found in the oldest scriptures of all the Indian systems. dhe Sūtrakstāgnasūtra and Brahmajālasūtra state many varieties of them. The BỊhadā - raṇyaka Upanişad describes the materialist conception as follows:
"The mass of consciousness rising from these material elements disappears into them. qhere is no consciousness after death."1
There are two views regarding the emergence of consciousness. Some hold that it is produced as something new while others maintain that it is only a manifestation of the thing which was lying dormant in the constituent elements.
It is generally argued against the Cārvāka, if there is no eternal soul taking successive births and having consciousness as its characteristic, why there is a difference in the status. Some persons are happy while others miserable. This cannot be explained without admitting previous life. To this Cārvāka replies that this difference does not necessarily imply the exisience of previous life and a permanent soul. The difference in status is just like bubbles in the ocean. There is no ethical cause behind it. The lack of certain element in the body hampers its full development. The result is diseases and other miseries. All the phenomena of happiness and misery have physical or material causes at their root.
The idea of 'I'ness also cannot prove the existence of a separate self. It is related with the body just as in the case of 'I am fat.' Moreover, all the activities attributed to the self are invariably connected with the body. We do not see anything which can postulate a separate existence of the self. There is
1. Bțbadāranyaka