Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
no reason to discard the visible cause and postulate invisible one, whose existence cannot be otherwise proved.
It can be argued; if the four elements are sufficient to manifest or produce the power of consciousness, why it is not generated in jar etc.
The Cārvāka replies that it depends upon the peculiar combination of elements as it is in the case of intoxicant herbs. Only a peculiar variety of herb, compounded in a peculiar way can produce intoxication and not otherwise; similarly the elements put in a peculiar way with a definite proportion and combination can generate the power of consciousness. The Materialist view criticized
Vidyānandal advances the following arguments against the materialist theory :
The existence of the self is proved on the basis of introspection. Every body feels. "I am happy"; "I know" "I desire" etc. This notion of 'I' refers to the self without any contradiction or doubt. This should not be confused with the physical reference of 'I am fat'. Introspection is internal appearance while the latter is external. There is a clear distinction between the two appearances of 'I am fat' and 'I am happy'. The former depends upon the external senses while the latter is purely mental. Secondly, the introspection is always followed by 'l' representing to something internal while the physical cognition appears as 'this' also, and refers to something external. Thirdly, the object of introspection is confined to the individual. Caitra cannot perceive the pleasure or pain of Maitra. But the object of external appearance is common to every-body. The fatness of Caitra can be seen by Maitra as good as by Caitra. These factors show a clear line of demarcation between the two. The experiences of 'l' am fair coloured, I am fat' etc., on the basis of which the Cārvāka tries to connect the notion of I with the
1. T. ślokavārtika, p. 28-31.