Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
The Nyaya-view Criticized (1) Relation between the self and consciousness
If consciousness (buddhi) is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the consciousness of A is in the same position to his soul as the consciousness of B. That is to say, both consciousnesses would be equal strangers to the soul of A and there is no reason why his consciousness should serve him better than the consciousness of any other person, in determining the nature of things; in fact there is no such thing as his consciousness, all consciousness being equally foreign to him.
(2) Inherence does not solve the Difficulty :
The Nyāya tries to explain the above objection by introducing the theory of inherence (samavāya). But, the relation of inherence also being one, eternal and all-pervasive, helps very little in this respect. It cannot fix any limitation that the thing which is related with A cannot relate with B through the same relation. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, the soul also is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the consciousness gene. rated in the soul of A is not in the same relation with B or others. Eternity of the soul challenged :
Further, the Vaigesika (pilupāka) holds that the quality of a substance never changes, without destruction of the substance. When the colour of a jar changes, it does not change by itself. The old colour is destroyed only when the jar also containing it, is destroyed; new colour is produced after the new jar has come into existence. If the same principle is applied in the case of consciousness the soul will become perishable. The Nyāya will have to accept the destruction of soul alongwith the destruction of consciousness.
Another difficulty :
Even, if it is accepted that inherence unites consciousness