Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
consists of many other aspects also in addition to the existence, The aspects of existence and non-existence are governed by four factors. They are: Substantiality (Dravya), Space (Ksetra), Time (Kāla) and State (Bhāva). Everything exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and the state. The same thing does not exist in relation to the substantiality etc. possessed by another thing. But, as far as reality is concerned, both aspects are objective and stand on equal footing. As a matter of fact they are implied by each other. Existence implies nonexistence in relation to the factors Other than governing the existence. Similarly, non-existence implies existence in different relations. One without the other is unconceivable. To say, that one is real and objective and the other as unreal and merely conceptual has no reason. The cognition of both the aspects is an experience, based on external reality. The Jaina differs from the Mimāṁsā also which holds that the cognition of absence (abhāva) as purely mental.
Generality and Particularity
What has been said about existence and non-existence, applies to the question of generality and particularity also. The Buddhists like Dinnāga and Dharmaksrti hold that sense-experience is confined to particularity only. The class-concepts are purely mental and are added to the particulars afterwards. Kant also holds that the time, space, class and all other categories of understanding are supplied by the mind. According to Jainism generality and particularity, both are objective. Nothing is supplied by the mind. They are two aspects of the same reality rolled into one. The mind only arranges them.
Knowledge : True and False
It can be argued; if nothing appears in knowledge which does not exist objectively, the difference between true and the false would disappear; as both of them would refer to the objects existing externally. The Jaina replies that objectivity or subjectivity of a cognition has nothing to do with its truth or