Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 218

General Conception of Knowledge
upon any external factor. But, when a person wants to stress. upon one of them he expresses it in relation to this or that. factor. That existence does not depend upon the cognizer. The : cognizer is free to choose any of the qualities already existing : for his expression. He cannot impose anything new. Similarly,.. no quality exists in relation to him.
Secondly, the Jaina does not say that all the qualities and! relations are physical. The existences are physical as well as non-physical. But non-physicality does not necessarily mean subjectivity. There are many non-physical objective qualities; such as knowledge, action etc. which are neither subjective. por physical.
Thirdly, the Jaina would not say that the perception of the convergence of the rails is true. It emphatically denies the relation of convergence with the rails. It only says that all the factors of convergence and rails are supplied by the experience. The defective appearance is the result of the defective sight or angle of vision. We cannot say that the convergence or other relations exist as they appear. They are wrongly imposed there by the defective sight, passions or other factors.
Thus, the Jaina is free from the difficulty which was faced by the objectivist. The Jaina does not place all the notions, true as well as wrong at the same lavel. According to him, both are: objective, but in the one case the context is real while in the other perverted. Moreover, subjective elements as those of feelings, passions and others also play an important part in such cases. They are generally a mixture of feeling and knowing. If we dissect the two elements clearly the difficulty will be removed by itself. The Jaina and Kant
According to Kant our knowledge, no doubt, begins with experience, but is not wholly derived from experience. Knowledge consists of impressions derived from experience, together with other elements supplied by the faculty of knowledge from.