Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 320

Indirect Knowledge
295
The Definition of Sruta
Viseșāvaśyaka gives two definitions of Śruta. According to the first, whatever is the object of auditory sense is śruta.1 But, the sound as the definition leads, cannot be included in the divisions of knowledge, still it is known as śruta; because, it plays important part in producing śruta-jñāna. It is called Dravyasruta, meaning the material cause of Sruta-jñāpa.
Sruta in the real sense means the knowledge produced by senses and the mind; associated with sound and capable of being expressed into words. It is known as Phāvaśruta in contrast with Dravyasruta. Limits of Mati and Sruta
There are three parts in the above definition. The first part is related with the cause, which is the same as in Mati. As a matter of fact sruta does not depend upon external senses. It has the mind only as its producing cause. Even, in the case of auditory sense, it is mati as far as the question of grasping the sound is concerned. The stage of śruta begins when one starts to formulate an idea on the basis of its meaning. The second part distinguishes Sruta from Mati. It holds that the knowledge based on speech is Sruta. The mati does not depend upon speech. Roughly, this factor distinguishes the two types of knowledge from each other. By speech, here, Jinabhadra says, we should take the words, whose meaning is already known. It means that the auditory sense is not so important as the words of other person, whether spoken or written, to produce śrutajñāna. But, one can say that everything that is seen, touched, smelt or tasted has a meaning behind it. Our mind brings out that meaning after due delibearation. We see a particular arrangement of colour and shape and interpret it as flower. We relish a sweet taste and interpret that it is a mango fruit. This process is common with all the senses and their objects, and nor merely with words, There is no reason in including the one 1. Višesāvaśyakabhāsya G. 81 2. This complete discussion based on Việesävaśyakabhāsya
and its commentary G. 81-176