Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
consciousness, or pare seasation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sparsa), feelings (vedanā), ideas (samjna) volitions (cetanā) and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty six elements. So, it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of mind. According to the Buddhism every thing is a momentary flash. So, there is nothing to move towards the other, no contact, no seizing grasping or reflection of any sort. Because, all of these phenomena presume continuity for more than one moment. The phenomenon of knowledge, 2 according to Buddhism, is a compound phenomenon, resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. According to the laws of interconnection (pratityasamutpāda), some elements invariably appear accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (rūpa), a moment of the sense of vision matter (caksuh) and a moment of pure consciousness (citta) arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (sparsa) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same law never appears alone, but always supported by an object (visaya), and a receptive faculty (indriya). When we say that consciousness cognises its object it does not mean that consciousness has to perform some function. It simply appears in coordination (sārūpya) with its objective elements. It is, properly speaking, doing nothing. Regarding the self-cognizability of knowledge the Buddhism agrees with the Jaina.
The Yogācāra school of Buddhism totally denies the existence of external things. It holds consciousness as a series of reflexes appearing one after another. It proposes that citta itself appears into the forms of different objects. So, there is no cognition of the object existing independently. 3
1. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 37 2. Ibid., p. 35 3. Suzuki, Larkāvatāra