Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 182

The General Conception of Knowledge
157
the cause of memory. After sensation the mind begins to construct images, corresponding to the external object. These images are modifications of consciousness called jñeyākāra. Akalanka explains it in the following way:
The reflection in a mirror is just like its prototype. But, the latter is not the content of mirror. The mirror contains the reflection only. Similarly, knowledge contains the images or concepts only. They distinguish one cognition from the other; and not the physical objects. It is immaterial whether those concepts resemble the external objects or depend upon them. We have the concepts of past and future objects also. Some of them are real, others mutilated or disfigured, others are merely fanciful.
The theory of the two forms of jñānākāra and jõeyākāra needs further elucidation just to avoid confusion with other systems. The Yogācāra admits that the knowledge itself appears into the forms of subject and object; and the external objects do not exist at all. The Jaina view is different from it It holds that the external physical objects exist as they appear. But, they do not appear as the content of knowledge. The contents of knowledge are subjective while the material things are objective. The Sānkhya and Vedānta systems hold vștti as taking the form of object. But, that is a real physical transformation. The antahkarana of the Vedānta and buddhi of the Sankhya are material objects. The consciousness or caitanya of the Jaina is not material. It is not transformed in the shape of the object. Jñeyākara means the state of being qualified with the content. It is just like the mirror with reflection. The Jaina position differs from the coordination (tadākāratā) of the Buddhist also. The Sautrāntika holds that the jñāna is coordinated with the object. The Jaina admits that it is mere attention of the object. The Vedānta and Sankhya hold pure consciousness and vịttijñāna as representing the jñānākāra and jñeyâkāra respectively. But, according to Jainism they are not two separate entities. They are one and the same thing. The division of two forms is merely logical.