Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
maintains that Īhā is a desire for the knowledge of particular rity. The Nyāya contends that desire does not necessarily precede knowledge. Even, the objects which we do not desire, come to be known. The Jaina replies that we come across hundreds of things in our daily life; but, only about a few of them, reach the stage of judgement. This difference cannot be explained without accepting the existence of desire, distinct or indistinct, for knowing. Even in the case of undesirable things the desire for knowing cannot be ruled out. Desire for possession is something different from that knowing. This desire is explicit in the advanced stages of knowledge. On the same ground it can be postulated in other stages also. Moreover, Īhā is a mental contemplation on data supplied by the senses. This contemplation is not universal. Some objects disappear altogether after the first sensation withcut leaving any mark or impression on the mind. Only those which impress the mind, favourably or unfavourably, are contemplated further till the stage of judgement. These phenomena lead us to the conclusion that a desire precedes the judgement. This desire is not of a general type, where the agent follows bis freewill. It is forced upon the cognizer by sensation. The cognizer has to limit his. choice within the boundaries, constructed by sensation.
Ihā and Doubt (samsaya)
It can be argued that ībā cannot be differentiated from doubt. Both of them are apprehensions without any decision. The Jaina replies that there is a lot of difference between the two. In doubt one wavers in two or more alternatives without reaching the stage of judgement. He puts equal balance on all the alternatives. It leaves the subject in confusion. Thā does not waver amongst alternatives. It naturally advances towards a judgement. It prepares the ground for the latter. It speculates the nature of a thing on logical ground and inclines towards accepting one alternative and rejecting the others. Ihā does not lead to perversity or confusion. 1. Višeşāvaśyakatikā G. 289