Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 444

Direct Knowledge
419
When the complete wall is removed the certain rays coming through the hole amalgamate in the full gloom.
3. Yasovijaya explains the same in different manner. He compares kevalajñānāvarana with the clouds obscuring the sun. Though the cloud enshrouds the light of the sun; yet its obscurance is not very thick. It is not so strong as to wipe out the difference between day and night. But, that dim light also can be further obscured by wall etc. The āvaraņas of mati etc. are compared with this obscurance. At the time of kevala the obscurance of both the types is destroyed. This also means a sort of merger into the complete knowledge. But, Yasovijaya introduces a new theory. He says that kevalajñānāvarana has two functions. On one hand it obscures the keyalajñāna; on other hand, it produces the incomplete knowledge, which is further obscured by the other types of avarana. When the kevalajñānāvarana is removed the question of the existence of incomplete knowledge does not arise. It is evident that Yaśovijaya is clearly influenced by the Vedantic conception of the two functions of avidyā. An āvarana can conceal the light as well as blur the vision so that the object appears as disfigured, as in the case of whirling stick lighted at the ends (ālātacakra) or the appearance of two moons. But, where the knowledge is correct, whether partial or complete, it cannot be produced by āvaraña. The Vedantic conception of viksepaśakti can be justified on the ground that the appearance of external objects is false. It must have some defect in the cause. But, the Jainas do not hold the appearance of external objects as false. It is as true as the cognition produced by kevala. The difference lies in quantity and not in quality. Kevalajñāna and its āvarana are opposed to each other. The latter cannot produce kevalajñāna. In the same way it cannot produce any other knowledge which holds the same nature as kevala.
4. Kundakunda proposes a fundamental difference between the two types of knowledge. He says that kevala is natural (svabbāva) while the other types are extra-natural (vibhāva)2. 1. Pravacanasāra. 1/47-49 & 58.