Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
determination is reached through ipference. He holds absence of articulation (kalpanāpodham) as the criterion of perception.
According to the logical school of Jainism the criterion is distinctiveness.1 The object appears clearer and more distinct in perception than it does in inference etc. This distinctaess cannot be described in words but can be experienced by everybody. A perceived object is more distinct than the one inferred or known through verbal authority. This is why one desires to perceive the object which has been already cognized by inference or verbal authority.
This definition is common to the sense-cognition as well as supersensual cognition. The Āgamic school defined perception on the basis of cause. The logical school defines the same on its intrinsic character.
As far as the derivation of the term is concerned Jainas hold that akşa means jiva or the self. The senses according to them are something exterpal to aksa. Pratyaksa means the cognition presented to aksa or the self directly. The definition of Parokşa
The term paroksa does not have any independent definition. All cognition other than pratyaksa is recognised as paroksa. According to the Agamic conception paroksa means indirect knowledge. The other systems do not propose paroksa as a different category in contrast with pratyaksa but go directly into its divisions.
The above order of fivefold division places mati and sruta first and then the other types. We shall discuss in the same order. It has been stated before that according to the Agamic conception mati and śruta are paroksa or indirect. The next chapter therefore is titled as "Indirect Knowledge." 1 Parlkşāmukha II, 3. 2 Parikṣāmukha II, 4. 3 Pravacanasāra I, 57; 58 Višeşāvaśyaka Bhásya 89.99;
Anuyoga Țikā p. 149