Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
quality that exists in the material cause and continues in its different modes. This is why, guņas are related with dravya only. Moreover, g'iņa does not change with the change of paryāya. The necklace and the bangle possess the same guņas. The Jaina does pot admit the destruction of all guņas with the destruction of a dravya and the emergence of all the gunas a new with every new dravya, as the Nyāya holds.
In consideration of pudgala as dravya, colour, taste, smell and touch are guņas, The various forms of cloth, jar are dravyaparyāyas and the different shades of colour are gunaparyāyas. When gold is considered as dravya the notion of guna and paryāya will change accordingly. Then, we shall not consider the qualities that distinguish pudgała from the other substances; but, those which distinguish gold from the other objects. These qualities last as long as the substance subsists. The qualities of colour etc. are eternal because, they are related with an eterpal substance, i.e. pudgała. The question of gold is different its qualities are not eternal; because, gold is not eternal. Eternity of gunas means only the existence, as long as the substance exists. The difference between eternal and temporary dravyas is based on the conception that eternal dravyas are not interchangeable. The matter cannot be transformed into soul. The non-existence of one eternal dravya as the other is recognised in Jainism as atyantābhāva, which is eternal. On the other hand the temporary dravyas are inter-changeable. The atoms constituting a jar are liable to be transformed into a cloth. The nonexistence of one temporary dravya into the other is anyonyābhāva; which is temporary.
The Vaiseșika view compared : According to Jainism the criterion of existence is causal efficacy. The Vaiśesika does not support this view. It hoids existence as a separate category and a thing is existent when it inheres in that category. On this very ground the Vaiśesika distinguishes a reality from other categories. He holds the first three categories, i, e. dravya, guna 1. Vaiśeşikasūtra 1.2.7