World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

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imperceptible traces). For our purposes the third kind of alaukika, namely, yogi or yogaja, which goes beyond far beyond the bounds of sense than the previous two is of particular interest.
This chapter proposes to disentangle this debate and set out the case for and against yogaja-perception in all its intricacies, and possible ramifications for a folk-phenomenology of cognition (vis-a-vis omniscience, heavens, and churchlands). The textual sources for Nyaya are drawn from BhasaParichheda, Siddhanta-muktavali, Karikavali, Nyayakusumanjari, Tattvacintamani; (for Mimamsa), Slokavarttika, Tantravarttika, Sastradipika, as well as some twentieth century interventions, notably by Matilal (almost mutely), Stephen Phillips (his derivation of 'mystical empiricalism' from Sri Gangesa), Ramanuja Tattacharya, KT Pandurangi, and a compendium called Sastralokah. This chapter argues that the Nyaya have not distanced themselves from the metaphysics of the Upanisads, while the Mimamsa follow the stringent Brahmanas, and reject vibhu (pervasion of the mind) in place of eye-light reaching out to conjunct, for instance, with emanated-light from the extinct stars.
But more significantly, in the bottom-down Nyaya epistemology, the discourse is tied up with the issue of omniscience (sarvajnana), exemplified first-up by Isvara-the-paramatma, next, via the Aquinian gradation of lesserperfections, by the moksa-attained mind-less kevalin (i.e. a state empty of all conceptual cognitive contents), then by the yukta (in continual samadhistate of 'knowing what-all') and finally, the viyukta (in yunjana or cintamaticoncentration frame, by ordinary sensorial contact with subtle, imperceptibilia, elusive qualia, and very distant things). Bhogis can have claim neither to sarvajna nor to yogaja, though they could be alluring through summoning up magical and tantric powers, causing halloo-balloo in the basement regions.
Jaina and Buddhists accept the doctrine of omniscience in an attenuated way for the highly-attained human beings like the Buddha and Jina, and some part of their leanings on yogic-perceptibility converges with the Nyaya view (except on the first two alaukika-kinds) in respect of practicing yogis, bodhisattvas, arhats, and demi-gods. The Mimamsa, as will be seen, are worried about a universal claim to omniscience based on the Buddha's supposed all-knowing capabilities, and so, not ever having accepted the existence of a Personal Deity either, omniscience cried out to be refuted once and for all. Its corollary, yogic-perceptibility, also stands to be scrambled, lest such a self-possessed person becomes a cultural icon and begins to be worshipped as another Buddha or a Baba. As long as the Vedas are there, Kumarila agues, 'what for there is any need for a sarvajna ... or, for that matter, yogaja-pratyaksa?'
There is though the notion of apurva, the mediating unknown po
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