World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 627

!
The above-mentioned problem may be solved in a different way as suggested by Dinakara. To him the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in the form of recollection must be the uncommon cause (karana) in the context of the consideration in the form of recollection (smaranātmaka-parāmarśasthale) to the inferential knowledge through the help of impression (samakāradvāra).12 The uncommon causality (karanatva) of the knowledge of vyāpti to the inferential cognition can be substantiated through the relation of consideration generated out by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (svajanyaparāmarśasam bandhena). Now what is to be understood by the term 'svajanyatvd (i.e., the property of being generated through self), which is inserted as a qualifier of parāmarśa ? The property of being produced by self (svajanyatva) is in the form of effectness determined by causeness which is limited either by itself or by the relation of inherence existing in it (svanistha-samavāyasvajanyasamskārānyatara-sambandhāvacchinna-karanatāni-rūpita käryatārūpam).3 In other words, the knowledge of vyāpti may be uncommon cause to the inferential cognition (where there is parāmarsa in the form of recollection) through the relation of impression produced by the knowledge of vyāpti. If there is parāmarśa in the actual world, but not in the level of recollection, the knowledge of vyāpti may be an uncommon cause to such inferential cognition through the relation of inherence existing in the knowledge of vyāpti itself. When the knowledge of vyāpti exists actually, but not in the memory, it remains through the relation of samavāya or inherence. Hence it is not proper to say that the uncommon instrumentality or causality (karanatva) of the knowledge of vyāpti is not possible to the inferential cognition generated by a consideration (parāmaría), which is really perceived.
It has been said by Viśvanātha that, when a reason remains in the non-locus of the probandum, it is called uncommon inconstant reason (asādhāranah sādhyā-samānādhikarano hetuh). In this case the apprehension of the co-locusness of sādhya with hetu is hampered with the probans employed here (tena sādhya-sāmānādhikaranyagrahah pratibaddhyate).14
In this context Dinakara has given a clarification of the above mentioned point. What is to be understood by the term - ‘pratibadhyate i.e., obstructed or impediment? What is hampered or obstructed here? How is it obstructed ? It is said that the apprehension of the coexistence (sāmānādhikaranyagrahd) which is the precondition of being an invariable relation (vyāptighatakībhūta) has become an impediment to the knowledge of vyāpti. In this way, common (sādhārana), uncommon (asādhārana) and inconclusive (anupasamhārī) become the faulty reasons by virtue of being their impediments the ascertainment of vyāpti or invariable relation. In the case of common (sādhārana) there is an
578