World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 837

produce a “jar' and 'jar', when it is produced, is not without the essence of clay. It is also different, because, before its production as a 'jar', there was merely clay and the 'jar' was not in a manifested form. It has no practical efficiency to carry out work as a “jar'. Thus Siddhasena rightly pointed out that, the Nyāya-Vaišesikas and the Bauddhas are right in so far they point out the faults and fallacies of the Sankhya view of causality and the Sankhyas are correct in so far as they criticise the Nyāya-Vaiśeșikas and Bauddhas. But when these two views of causality are adjusted together in compliance with the anekānta method, the result will be the true insight. 26
Even Advaita Vedāntins' views of causality is one-sided and it can be reconciled with the help of anekānta. It is true as Vedāntins hold that effect cannot be described in language, it is inexpressible. But indescribability does not mean, unreal or false. Indescribability of the effect is not absolute, it is indescribable only in some respects. Effect is neither, absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. It is both real and unreal.27
The problem of universal and particular is, again, one of the most controversial problems in the field of philosophy. According to Advaita Vedānta, there is only one highest universal (mahāsāmānya) in which everything is included. 28 Some of the Buddhists claim that, particulars are the only reals. Nyāya-Veiseșikas give equal treatment to both sāmānya and višesa as principles of reality, but recognise them as absolutely distinct entities 29 But all these views are partial representation of truth. Reality is neither absolutely universal nor absolutely particular. Suppose if we accept that there is nothing except the general and that there is no such thing as particular, (as Vedāntins maintain) then we should be forced in everyday activity to give up all the particulars of a thing and to accept only its general aspect. For instance, all the transformations of gold, such as ear-rings, bracelets, necklace etc., that are real in our daily life and that are actually experienced by us shall have to be given up and everytime we shall have to deal with gold as gold and nothing else—no varieties of transformations of it. If on the other hand, we accept only the particulars of gold such as ear-rings, bracelets, etc. and eliminate the underlying substance gold from our daily exchange, then we have to face great confusion and inconvenience in our daily experience. The truth is that exclusive acceptance of the general only or particular only would land us into utter confussion. We thus, have to accept,
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