World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 841

Indian literature and is traceable here and there in all the non-Jaina works such as Nāsadiyasūkta of Ķgveda, Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, Upanisadas, Bhagavadgitā, Mahābhārata and so on. In fact, even Jaina thinkers themselves maintained that every system of philosophy has accepted anekānta in one way or the other1 The Materialists (Cārvākas) view that, consciousness is product of combination of different material elements which is neither identical or different from each of these, is acceptance of manysided aspects of consciousness only. It really means, in some respects, it is identifiable with material elements and in some respects, different from them. Madhyamamārga or Madhyamāpratipat of the Buddhists, which is accepted as middle way between two extreme view of eternalism and non-eternalism, bears the same significance as the word anekānta. Madhyamika philosopher's view of reality, that, it is neither existent nor nonexistent, nor both nor neither', is a form of anekāntavāda only.42 Even, the view of Vijñānavāda Buddhists, according to which this world is transformation of eternal, non-dual consciousness (vijnana), is ac ceptance of parināminityatā of anekāntavāda. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika philosophers apply this anekāntavāda without being aware of it. These philosophers in stating that atoms constituting a material 'pot are eternal while the pot as a product and a passing phase of matter is non-eternal, are practically admitting the anekānta position, which is that a 'pot' is non-eternal in some respects (as a mode of matter) and that it is eternal also in some respects.44 (i.e, in respect of its constitutive substance). Again, while describing anyonyābhāva, the Vaiseșikas point out like Jainas that ‘pot' is real as ‘pot' not as cloth.*45 Earth, (prthivi) is both eternal as well as non-eternal. Citrarüpa is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive rūpas which belong to a single substance.46 Even though Nyāya-Vaišeșikas have accepted the generality and particularity as two idependent categories, they are not able to discard the path of anekānta. Vātsyāyana mentions that both contradictory elements can exist in one and the same place.47 Jāti is, again, both general as well particular.48 Amongst the two kinds of universals, (i.e. parā and aparā) aparāsāmánya is both, general as well as particular. 49
The Sānkhya doctrine of evolution of prakrti according to which Prakriti is neither absolutely eternal nor absolutely changing, but eternal-cum-change is in no way different from the Jnāna doctrine of parināminityatā. The difference between the two view is that the Sāńkhya doctrine is applicable only to non-sentient prakrti, while the
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