World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 626

exists in the subject of inference' (pakse vyāpyah) or in the form - "The subject is the locus of the pervaded" (pakso vyāpyavān).
In this connection a rejoinder is given by Dinakara in order to avoid certain type of philosophical complication. To him it cannot be said that there would arise a question of deviation (vyabhicāra) with each other. In other words, one type of consideration (Paramarsa) cannot be overlapped with the another type. Because one inferential cognition is differentiated from another by the limitor of effectness (kāryatāvacchedaka).10 The limitor of effectness existing in a particular type of inferential cognition caused by a particular type of consideration (parāmarśa) does not exist in another type of inferential cognition caused by another consideration (parāmarsa). The question of overlapping or extension of one inference to another does not arise at all because one inference caused by a particular form of parāmarśa is distinct from another one. In this case a particular form of parāmarsa becomes a distinguishing mark from others. If in an inference parāmarśa remains in the former form (pakse vyāpyah), the inference is itself distinguished through this. If anumāna (inference) is an effect, the paramarśa of the first type, which distinguishes it from another one, is the limitor of effectness (kāryatāvacchedaka). In the same way, an inference having second type of parāmarśa becomes distinguished from the earlier one due to have another type of parāmarśa. This is the limitor of effectness in the second inference. Due to having different limitors of effectness (kāryatāvacchedaka) there does not arise any question of deviation or overlapping
Dinakara has raised another problem in connection with consideration (parāmarśa). To him it may be argued by the opponents that the uncommon causality (karanatva) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is not possible in the case of the paramarsa (consideration) in the form of recollection (smaranātmakaparāmarśasthale)." As this type of parāmarśa is recollective in nature which has its existence in the memory alone, it is produced from the impression (samskāra) of the knowledge of vyāpti alone. To depend on the impression (samskāra) alone leads to the land of risk in the realm of logic. As this type of parāmarśa is generated through impression (samskāra) alone, the real existence of the perceptual cognition of Vyāpti is non-verifiable and hence uncertain. Hence, it would not work as an uncommon cause (karana) of the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa. In other words, such type of parāmarśa in the form of recollection is generated through impression even when there is the absence of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) leading to the impossibility of its special causality (karanatva).
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