World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 834

according to which substance is the fundamental reality and the modifications are nothing apart fiom it and paryāyāstika, which states that, modifications are the only reality, the substance being nothing apart from them.16 The first one may be called, view-point of generality and the second one, the view-point of particularity. These different kinds of nayas or standpoints represent views of different schools of thought, which are partially true. Naigama naya recognises both the universal and the particular. Nyāya-Vaiśesikas are the followers of this naya because they recognise both the universal and the particular, in an isolated and non-relative sense. Samgraha naya, unholds the universal only. Advaitins and Sankhyas, represent this naya, because former merges all particulars in the universal, 'sat' and the latter to the cause prakrti. Vyavahāra is a point of view of commonsense view, which does not penetrate below the surface of things. The Materialists (Cārvāka) way of looking at things is that of vyavahāra. Rjusūtra refers to changing modes only and states that reality is always in constant flux. Buddhist view of ksanabhargavāda is a very good example of this naya. Sabdanaya accepts single object denoted by variants of synonymous terms. Samabhirūdha goes a step further and accepts different meanings or synonyms based on their etymology. Evambhūta takes the word signifying an object, which possesses the action, connoted by etymology. The Grammarians and the Mīmāmsakas represent the sabda and other nayas, because they emphasize the grammatical, etymological importance of words.11 In this way, nayaväda comprises views of all others. These views are right in their own respective spheres but if they are taken in absolute sense they are wrong and become fallacious (durnaya). 18
The doctrine of syādvāda or saptabhangi entertains within its fold every possible theory. It welcomes in it, all nayas and thus is like a necklace of pearls wherein every system has its proper place like a pearl. 19A In this doctrine discordent notes are blended so as to make a perfect harmony. As rivers mingle in the ocean, so do all the systems mingle in the syādvāda. 19B
The doctrine of syādvāda is nothing but systematic description of many-sided nature of reality in words. Jaina thinkers claim that no philosophical proposition can be true if it is simply asserted without condition. If it is asserted, then, it becomes one-sided (ekānta) view. It also excludes ether rival possibilities. To avoid this shortcoming, syādvāda makes use of the convenient particle syāt' (=in certain
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