World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 630

perceived visually or any other ways (cākṣuṣatvadyasambhavat). This type of cognition through upamana cannot described as a mental fact because the awareness like I am knowing through comparison' (upaminomi) is possible in us through it is not originated just after some mental activities. Moreover, the awareness in the form - I am directly perceiving' (sākṣātkaromi) does not arise at all just after the attainment of the cognition through comparison and hence there is no evidence in favour of its consideration as a perceptual one. We cannot take something granted if there is no evidence in its favour. Otherwise, an inferential cognition would have been taken as a mental one. Such type of cognition called upamiti cannot be incorporated under inferential cognition due to its origination without the help of the knowledge of vyapti etc. This cannot be included in testimonial cognition due to its non-origination from the knowledge of words and sentences. It cannot be taken as memory, because the object which is not directly realised cannot be remembered. In such cases we are having cognition of something (e.g., gavayd), which is not at all seen or realised earlier. Hence upamāna has be admitted as a form of distinct pramāna.22
The classification of implicative meaning called Lakṣaṇā as jahatsvärtha (a word while giving implicative meaning forsakes its own primary meaning) and ajahatsvärtha (a word does not forsake its own primary meaning while referring to a secondary or implicative meaning) is categorically mentioned by Dinakara in his commentary and made some comments on them, which are worth-pondering.
In the famous case of lakṣaṇā - 'Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' (The milkman colony is on the Gangātīratiratvena bodha) or simply understood as 'a bank' (tiratvena bodha). If the form is accepted then this case will lose its character as an implication in which the primary meaning is totally rejected (jahatsvārthatvahāniḥ). If the latter is taken for granted then it would lose its character as lakṣaṇā in which the primary meaning is not totally rejected (ajahatsvārthā). In fact, if the term 'Ganga' is interpreted as 'a bank' alone (tiratvena), it would be accepted a jahatsvarthā (an implication rejecting its primary meaning). It would be accepted by all because it is obvious that the primary meaning of the term is totally rejected. But if the term 'Ganga' means 'the bank of Ganga it would be a case of ajahatsvārtha' i.e., an implication where the primary meaning is retained but extended. In this case the meaning of the term 'Ganga' is retained as well as extended to the bank also. Such type of extension of meaning is also available in the following cases of implication. When it is said 'Let the sticks enter' (Yasthih pravesaya) or 'The platform is crying (mañcāḥ krośanti), both the terms 'sticks' and 'platform' have retained their meaning and extended to 'the holders of the stick' and 'someone occupying the platform' respectively. Hence these are also the
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