Book Title: World of Philosophy
Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan
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1. The view advocating sole competence of sense-organs (indriyādhipatyavāda) - Cārvāka.
2. The view advocating sole competence of non-sensuous organs (anindriyādhipatyavāda) - Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda and Samkarite Vedanta.
3. The view advocating equal competence of sense-organs and nonsensuous organs (ubhayādhipatyavāda) -Sāmkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiseṣika, Mīmāmsā and Vaibhāṣika and Sautrantika Buddhists.
4. The view advocating sole competence of the Scriptures(āgamādhipatyavāda) - Pūrvamīmāmsā.
5. The view advocating incompetence of all organs whatsoever(pramāṇopaplavavāda-tattvopaplavavāda) - Jayarāśi Bhatta.
The Jaina position can now be easily located among the above five positions. Jaina thinkers advocate the third view, i.e., ubhyādhipatyavāda. The Jaina tradition therefore rejects the remaining four positions.
C.
Four Indian Theories of Causation.
Sukhlalji, in his Introduction [Shah, (10-20)], has identified four theories of causation in Indian philosophy as under;
1. Arambhavada - Theory of Novel Creation. (Nyaya theory) 2. Pariņāmavāda-Theory of Real Modification including
Pradhanapariņāmavāda of the Samkhya system and the Brahma - pariņāmavāda - of thinkers like Vallabhācārya. There are thus three types of pariņāmavāda.
Sāmkhya-pariņāmavāda, Brahmapariņāmavāda and the Jaina
3. Pratītyasamutpādavāda -The Buddhist Theory of dependent origi
pariņāmavāda
nation.
4. Vivartavāda-The Kevaladvaita theory of illusory modification. We have two main types of Vivartavāda also- Nityabrahmavivartavāda of the absolute monistic Vedanta and kṣaṇikavijñānavivartavāda of the Buddhists.
Now here also Sukhlalji helps us to locate the Jaina position by saying that the Jaina theory is a kind of sarva-vyāpaka pariņāmavāda because it applies to the physical as well as conscious, gross as well as subtle ele
ments.
D. Five Indian Theories about the Nature and Object of Pramāņas.
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