World of Philosophy

Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan

Page 271

the Upanisads. This mahavakya that occurs in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad is regarded as an experiential statement of the pupil. The corresponding instructional statement of the preceptor is "Tat tvam asi". The logical and epistemological status of the Upanisadic statement, "Tat tvam asi" has come up in recent-day literature for discussion and debate. In January 1998 issue of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Daya Krishna opened up the debate by asking, 'Is "Tattvam Asi" the same type of identity statement as "The morning star is the evening star"?' He is interested here to find out the exact meaning of this statement and whether this statement and the other one, which is the favourite example of Frege, "The morning star is the evening star," are meaningful in the self-same way. According to him, "both the statements share a common problematic as they point to two seemingly different entities which are regarded as totally different from each other and yet which are really identical in a fundamental sense that is not known to those who see them as different." The difference, he says, is rooted in foundational experience, whereas their identity is rooted in more powerful and deeper level of experience. Daya Krishna seeks to show that the identity of Atman and Brahman is different from the identity of morning star and evening star. Thereafter some other scholars like N.S. Dravid and S.V. Bokil took up the discussion to new heights, but I would not discuss their views in detail. In this paper, I shall, first of all, discuss what exactly is an identity statement and then try to show what sort of identity statement, or what sort of statement, is "Tat tvam asi".
Two descriptive expressions might refer to one and the same thing. In that case, the meanings of the two expressions are different, whereas one and the same thing is there as the referent of both. There could have been two different things corresponding to the two descriptions, but, as a matter of fact, there is only one. It is possible that one and the same thing correspond to two expressions, both of which are names, e.g., 'Everest' and Sagarmatha' or "Kaunteya' and 'Radheya'. There could be cases where there is one and the same thing corresponding to two expressions, one of which is a name and the other a description, e.g., 'Everest' and 'the highest mountain of the world'. It appears that both the sorts of expressions, names and descriptions, are labels put upon things and, as such, it is supposed that they mean the things by naming them. Frege sought to point out that the supposition is wrong. He observed that the way a name has meaning is different from the way a description has meaning. A name cannot have meaning without anything in the world as its referent, i.e., in isolation. But a description could have meaning without there being anything in the world as its referent. It is an incomplete symbol. Accordingly, Frege made a useful distinction between the sense and the reference of an expression, which paved the way for further discussion by Russell and Wittgenstein.
The statement, "The morning star is the evening star" is labeled by some as an identity statement. But to label it thus becomes misleading in
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