Book Title: World of Philosophy
Author(s): Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan
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to the paradox generated by the use of the word 'identical' is quite enlightening: "Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at
all."
It is important to show, in this connection, the distinctive characters of a statement of conceptual identity. The structure of such a statement is different from that of a non-identity statement. We know that the basic structure of a statement symbolism that seeks to state something about the empirical world is that a particular is described under a universal. That is, the statement involves a distinction between two parts, namely, the particular (visayi) and the universal (visaya), or the support (adhisthana) and the ascription supported by it (adhyastha). The two are sought to be related by means of an assertive tie. The subject term of the statement stands for the support and the predicate term of the statement stands for the ascription. These two terms are related by such words as 'is' or 'am'. So a statement of the form, "This is thus and so" or "I am such and so", involves a relation that is fundamental for human thought and discourse about the empirical world. It is called a samsargavagahi (involving relation) statement.
In contradistinction with this sort of statement, an identity statement like "Atman is Brahman" or any or its variants does not involve a distinction between a subject term and a predicate term. They are not really bound by a relational tie. It is called a samsarganavagahi (not involving relation) statement. Such a statement appears to establish a relation between two terms because the device indicating the relation 'is' is there. But it is only the semblance of a relation. The reason is that there is no distinction between the subject term and the predicate term, strictly speaking. We must make it clear that the distinction between a subject and a predicate that is in question is not the grammatical distinction between a subject and predicate but a categorial distinction between the two. According to the categorial distinction, we know, a subject cannot function as a predicate and a predicate cannot function as a subject. Their functions are absolutely demarcated. The statement "Atman is Brahman" seeks to point beyond the distinction between the two. Yet, to speak within the bounds of the distinction, both the terms that appear as being related are subject terms. The statement in question is not an exact statement because Atman and Brahman are not strictly subject terms. There cannot, however, be a more exact statement to convey what it intends to convey. It intends to convey that Atman that constitutes the limit of the actual language or the factual discourse is the maximum approximation of Brahman that constitutes the ultimate limit of any possible language and discourse in respect of logical status. This is a statement of extraordinary structure belonging not to language and discourse, but to their limits. An ordinary identity statement like "This is that Devadatta" comes in between a non-identity statement at the one extreme and a necessary
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