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Jaina Philosophy and Religion
the two with the help of a gross illustration. When we see a group of cows from a distance, we first have a general cognition of the form 'They are all cows'. At this stage we direct our attention to the general features or the common nature of the cows. When the group approaches us, then if we pay attention to the specific features of the cows, viz., their colours, horns, shapes, sizes, etc., we grasp the differences obtaining among them. At this stage, we direct our attention mainly to the specific features of different cows.
Essentially, there is no difference between general cognition (darśana) and specific cognition (jñāna). Both are of the nature of cognition (bodha). Whatever difference obtains there between them is due to the difference in their respective objects. Hence, if we take jñāna in a broad sense, that is, in the sense of cognition (bodha), then it will cover darśanal also.
Almost all systems of Indian philosophy maintain that in the genesis of knowledge, at first there necessarily arises a type of cognition which reveals bare existence of a thing, without any particular. In other words, thinkers of all systems of Indian philosophy agree in maintaining that all cognitive process invariably takes its rise in a cognition which grasps the bare existence but where nothing is revealed in the form of a qualifier or a qualificand.
All our worldly dealings depend on the specific cognition (ñana = knowledge). This is the reason why while enumerating the eight main types of karmas already referred to by us, knowledge-covering karma is mentioned first. We have briefly dealt with the topic of jñāna (knowledge or specific cognition). Therein we have mentioned five types of knowledge, viz., mati, etc. Here let us go somewhat deep into the topic.
Matijñāna and śrutajñāna (specific verbal cognition = verbal knowledge) originate through the instrumentality of sense-organs and mind. In other words, as in the production of matijñāna so also in that of śrutajñāna, the assistance of the sense-organs and mind is needed. The specific cognition of the external objects like colour, taste, smell, etc., generated by sense-organs in contact with mind is a matijñāna of the form of empirical perception (sāṁvyavahärika pratyakşa). And the experience 1. Darśana is called sāmānya avabodha (general cognition), sāmānya upayoga (general
cognition), niräkära upayoga (detail-less cognition) or nirvikalpaka jñāna (indeterminate cognition = non-conceptual cognition = cognition free from thought), while jñāna is called višeşa avabodha (specific cognition), višeşa upayoga (specific cognition), sākāra upayoga (detailed cognition) or savikalpaka jñāna (determinate cognition = conceptual cognition = cognition involving thought).
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