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Jaina Logic
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cloth) cannot get it without introducing distinction among cloths; for certainly cloths are of numerous types. Hence it is that distinctions like the khadi cloth, the mill-cloth, etc., too, have to be introduced. Similarly, in the field of philosophy one says: "The thing of the form of existence is of two types, viz., the physical and the conscious; again, the conscious thing is of two types, viz., one entangled in the worldly life and the other emancipated from it. And further distinctions of the same sort have to be made. All such views tending towards making distinction are to be placed in the category of vyavahāra-naya. In short, the synthetic operation of intellect is sangraha-naya, while the analytic operation of intellect is vyavahāra-naya.
Rjusūtra-naya (The 'Straight-thread' standpoint): It is called rju (straight) because it does not bend towards the past or the future. It recognises the reality of the present only, neither of the past nor of the future, as the two latter are no more real than the 'horns of a hare'—which do nothing and, therefore, are nothing.
Though human imagination cannot absolutely ignore what is past or what is future, it often happens that human intellect, keeping its attention fixed on an immediately present consequence, begins to operate only in relation to what is present. Under such a situation, man's intellect begins to suppose as if only that which is present is real and efficacious, while that which is past or that which is future being not efficacious at present, is as good as void. Thus, a prosperity that is present can alone be called prosperity, because it alone is a means of happiness; on the other hand, the memory of the past prosperity or the anticipation of the future prosperity can never be called prosperity, because neither is a means of hap piness at present. Similarly, a son who is present and who serves his parents is a son; on the other hand, a son who existed in past or will exist in future but does not exist at present is not a son at all. This is all rjusutra standpoint. Again, this standpoint recognises only the present state of pleasure or pain. For it, what is present is real. It concentrates on the present state, condition or mode of a thing. For this view, even a householder is a monk, when he possesses auspicious mental states characteristic of a real monk. On the other hand, it regards even a monk as avrati (one who does not observe the vows) when he possesses mental states of unrestraint. Moreover, when a man who has taken a vow of keeping mind equanimous for fortyeight minutes, sitting at one place, indulges in evil thoughts, this view considers him to be one who has
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