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Jaina Logic
383
accepts only the fleeting aspect to the absolute exclusion of the persistent aspect of concrete reality is an instance of this pseudo-rjusūtra.
Pseudo-sabdanaya: When sabdanaya insists that different meanings or things conveyed by different (synonymous) words in accordance with different tenses, genders, etc., are absolutely different, it degenerates into pseudo-śabdanaya. The view that maintains that Rājagrha having the pasttense predication and Rajagļha having the present-tense predication are utterly different is an instance of pseudo-sabdanaya.
Pseudo-samabhirūdha: Samabhirudha-naya is one in which meanings of even synonymous words are distinguished in accordance with their different etymologies. But when it considers them to be absolutely different, it becomes pseudo-samabhirudha. In other words, if anybody thinks that corresponding to the different etymologies of synonymous words there are different individuals, he commits the fallacy of pseudo-samabhirūdha. If we construe the difference in meaning as implying difference in things, we will be indulging in pseudo-samabhirudha. Samabhirudha is a true standpoint as long as it accepts the distinction in the connotation of synonymous words in accordance with their different etymologies. But when it goes further and makes distinction in the denotation of the synonymous words on the basis of their different etymologies, then it becomes pseudosamabhirūdha.
Pseudo-evambhuta: Evambhūta-naya maintains that we can call a person or a thing by a particular name or word when and only when he actually performs the activity connoted by its etymology. When it stubbornly sticks to this view and obstinately insists that rājā cannot be called rājā when he is sleeping, then the view degenerates into pseudo-evambhūta.
The evambhūta standpoint asks us to apply the word 'păcaka' ('cook') to a person only when he is actually cooking, but not when he is sleeping or walking. If we absolutely maintain that a cook does not remain a cook unless he is cooking at the present moment, we will commit the fallacy of pseudo-evambhūta standpoint.
From the above exposition, it is clear that the non-one-sided view or syādvāda grasps or describes the multitude of various attributes of a thing, while one-sided view or naya thinks of any one attribute of the thing and primarily makes presentation of that attribute only. The former refers to the entire, undivided Reality or thing, while the latter to a fragment or an aspect of the same. The former is synthetic, while the latter is analytic. In the former, the entire Reality or a thing is comprehended synthetically
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