Book Title: Jaina Philosophy and Religion
Author(s): Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

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Page 410
________________ 382 Jaina Philosophy and Religion sal, viz. Existence. Para-sangraha says, “The entire universe as Existence is one." It takes into account pure substance in its highest universality (Existence) and remains indifferent to particulars or forms. But when it becomes aggressive and absolutely rejects particulars, it turns into pseudopara-sangraha. Apara-sangraha-naya brings proper things together under any of the lower universals and regards them as one or identical, remaining indifferent to their differentiating traits. It regards all the substances, viz., the soul, matter, time, etc. as identical, because they all possess dravyatva (substancehood) in common; it remains indifferent to their differences; But when, however, it does not rest content with grouping soul, matter, etc., together in one class, viz. substance class, but goes a step further and totally denies particular distinguishing features, it degenerates into pseudoapara-sangraha. Laying such an exaggerated and undue emphasis on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to pseudo-sangraha, a fallacy of which the Samkhya and the Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances. Pseudo-vyavahāra: Existence which is the subject-matter of sangrahanaya is divided and subdivided into various types by vyavahāra-naya in the following manner: "That which exists is either dravya (substance or universal) or paryāya (mode or particular); that which is dravya (substance) is either soul, or matter, or medium-of-motion, or medium-of-rest, or time, or space; that which is soul is either emancipated or bound (= worldly, transmigratory); and so on." But if you go further and insist upon an absolute difference of dravya (universal) and paryāya (particular), you commit the fallacy of pseudo-vyavahāra. When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored, the resultant fallacy comes to have only semblance of the vyavahāra standpoint. The materialism of Cārvāka in Indian philosophy is an instance of pseudo-vyavahāra. Pseudo-rjusūtra: Rjusūtra-naya accepts only the mode or state of the present moment. When, however, it goes further and denies the persistent substance altogether to which this mode or state belongs it degenerates into pseudo-rjusutra. It is generally held that the Buddhist philosophy accepts the momentary evanescent modes or states to be real and absolutely rejects substance which persists in all the three divisions of time and serves as the substratum of these momentary modes. Some such philosophy is given as an instance of pseudo-rjusūtra. The philosophical system that Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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