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Jaina Logic
337
character of origination, destruction and persistence—from one standpoint (i.e., the standpoint of modes or impermanent aspect), it is of the nature of origination and destruction, while from the other standpoint (i.e., the standpoint of substance or permanent aspect) it is of the nature of permanence.
If all things are exclusively impermanent (momentary), then since a new thing originates and perishes every moment and since this thing has got no permanent basis, there should never have been experience of likeness in relation to the concerned series of momentary transformations—that is, on seeing again a thing that was seen earlier there should in no way take place recognition in the form 'this is the same thing', for recognition requires on the one hand permanence in the thing that acts as its object and on the other hand permanence in the soul that acts as seer.
The doctrine of absolute impermanence would render memory impossible. The moment that had experience has been totally destroyed. So, how can another moment which has no connection whatsoever with that lost moment remember what that lost moment had experienced? It cannot be that the person who had experience is one and the person who remembers is another. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical, X would experience a thing and Y would remember it. In other words, any man would remember any thing, irrespective of the need of previous experience. The impossibility of recognition and memory would make all money transactions pertaining to debtors and creditors impossible and all our worldly dealings inexplicable.
Similarly, if either the physical or conscious verity is exclusively changeless, then in the universe which is of the form of a commixture of these two verities there should never crop up that variety which is there to be seen every moment. Hence it is that the doctrine of permanence-cumtransience is treated as tenable by the Jaina system of philosophy.
The method of syāduāda synthesises the two standpoints which find exclusive existence and exclusive non-existence in a thing. One should think as to what are the factors depending on which man regards a thing as existent. Everything exists by its own qualities alone, and not by the qualities of another thing. A man is virtuous by his own virtues, and not by another man's virtues. A person is rich by his own riches, and not by another person's riches. Father is father by his own son, and not by
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