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Jaina Philosophy and Religion
become everything. Apparently, it may seem that self-existence (sva-sattva) is identical with non-existence-of-others (para-asattva), that is, existenceof-x is identical with non-existence-of-non-x. But it is not so. They are different. Just as existence of a thing from the standpoint of its own nature is experienced independently, even so non-existence of a thing from the standpoint of the nature of others is experienced independently. By these two modes, one gains knowledge of two types. Knowledge generated by the first mode is different from that generated by the second mode. For example, when it is said, 'Mr. X is not in the market', from that proposition we cannot have the knowledge as to where he is. In spite of our knowledge that he is not in the bazar, our desire to know as to where he is persists; and for satisfying this desire the employment of the first mode is necessary. Even in practice, the employment of the mode pertaining to non-existence is necessary, though the mode pertaining to existence has already been employed. To say that there is a coin of a rupee in my hand is one thing and to say that there is not a coin of a dollar in my hand is another thing. Thus, the employment of both these modes is necessary.
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An objection to treating the second mode as logical complement to the previous mode is that the two modes being mutually opposed are contradictory. In answer, it is sufficient to point out that the two elements, constituting the two modes, are not contradictory, but on the contrary are in fact mutually necessary complements. Contradiction would arise if the propositions 'the jar exists' and 'the jar does not exist' were absolute. As they are relative, contradiction does not arise. The objecter wrongly understands the latter proposition, viz., "the jar does not exist", as equivalent to "the jar does not exist as the jar". The true interpretation of it should be that "the jar does not exist as things other than itself". A thing does not exist from the standpoint of substance, etc., of another thing. In fact, it is the very point which the critics of syādvāda often miss and which the upholders of syādvāda make out in their defence.
Third mode: The third mode is represented by the proposition, "From a certain standpoint a thing is certainly existent, and from another standpoint it is certainly non-existent". In this mode, it is shown as to what a thing is and what it is not, successively. This mode predicates of a thing the existence and the non-existence successively from two different standpoints. It offers successive presentation of existence and non-existence. Here affirmation and negation are made conjointly.
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