Book Title: Jaina Philosophy and Religion
Author(s): Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology

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Page 352
________________ 324 Jaina Philosophy and Religion and place at which the probandum is present. The only thing required of it is that it should have invariable concomitance with probandum. The present rise of Kșttikā works as an instrument of inferring the posterior rise of Rohiņi and the prior rise of Bharani, because Křttikā is having a relation of sequence with Rohini and Bharani, which is an invariable necessary relation. That which is contradictory of a particular thing acts as probans causing inferential knowledge of the absence of that thing. From certain facial changes we can infer the absence of the subsidence-of-anger. Here the probans of the form of certain facial changes is contradictory of the subsidence-of-anger or is the result of anger which is contradictory to the subsidence-of-anger. Therefore it acts as probans causing inferential knowledge of the absence of the subsidence-of-anger. From non-cognition of the bodily movements characterising health, we infer the presence of some disease in the body. The fact of our not seeing the bodily movements characterising health leads us to infer the lack of health, that is, the presence of some disease in the body. For our present purpose this is enough. We close this topic. There are two types of inference, viz. svārthānumāna (inference intended for oneself) and parārthanumāna (inference intended for others). Without being instructed or taught by others, when one infers probandum from probans independently with his own reasoning, then that inference is called svārthānumāna. On the other hand, the inference employed by one to explain to others the truth of the conclusion one has arrived at is called parārthānumāna. To illustrate, when a man, having inferred or known the existence of fire in a hill, tries to convince another man, who doubts or questions the truth of his knowledge, he argues like this: “The hill must be fiery; because it smokes; and whatever is smoky is necessarily and invariably fiery, e.g. the kitchen; so also the hill is smoky; therefore it is fiery." The statement generally contains five members. They are: proposition (pratijna), reason (hetu), example (udāharana), application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana). In the above example, they are as follows: (1) This place is fiery. (This is the statement of proposition or thesis or probandum). (2) Because it is seen smoky. (This is the statement of reason or probans). 3) All smoky things are fiery, e.g. the kitchen. (This is the statement of invariable concomitance, showing the necessary universal connection Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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