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Jaina Logic
323
with fire, one cannot infer fire from smoke. This is quite obvious. This shows that for inference the knowledge of invariable concomitance is necessary and this knowledge of invariable concomitance one can have through hypothetical reasoning (tarka).
Inference is the knowledge of sādhya (probandum) through the instrumentality of sādhana (probans). This means that on knowing or perceiving probans and consequently remembering the invariable concomitance of probans with probandum, the cogniser infers probandum. As for instance, when one who has known the universal relation that obtains between smoke and fire, that is, one who has comprehended the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, perceives smoke arising from some place, then at once he remembers the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire and consequently infers fire on that place. The emergence of inferential knowledge takes place subject to the fulfilment of two conditions, viz., perception or knowledge of probans and memory of the invariable concomitance of probans with probandum.
Let us study some cases of inference: (1) A particular place has fire on it because it possesses smoke. (2) Word is destructible because it is produced. (3) This is a tree because it is Nimba. (4) The constellation named Rohiņi will rise because the constellation named Krttikā has already risen. (5) The constellation Bharani rose before, because the constellation Kịttikā is rising. (6) A particular fruit must have a particular colour because it has a particular flavour. Or, it must have a particular flavour because it has a particular colour.
In these cases of inference, the first probans is of the form of effect (kārya), because smoke is an effect of fire. The second and the third ones are of the form of essential identity of nature (svabhāva). The fourth one is the predecessor (pūrvacara) because Kșttikā is the predecessor of Rohiņi. The fifth one is the successor (uttaracara) because Krttikā is the successor of Bharani. And the sixth one is co-occurrent or co-extensive (sahacara) because flavour and colour are co-occurrent or co-extensive.
From this we can have the idea of different types of probans. Again, we can see that it is not necessary that probans should be present when probandum is present. Kșttikā that is rising enables us to infer Rohiņī that is to rise as also Bharani that rose before. This means that probans and probandum-belonging to the same time or different times and to the same place or different places-should have invariable relation between them. It is not necessary for the probans to be present at that very time
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