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CHAPTER 5
JAINA LOGIC
Perception
That by which a thing is known rightly is called pramāna, i.e., valid knowledge. On the rise of valid knowledge doubt, illusion and ignorance are removed and the nature of a thing is known or understood rightly to a considerable extent. So valid knowledge is regarded as pramāņa. Having known a thing rightly, man decides to attain it, if it is desirable and to abandon it, if it is undesirable.
There are two types of valid knowledge, viz., direct and indirect. Objects, viz., colour, etc., are cognised through sense-organs, viz., eye, etc., assisted by mind. To be more explicit, colour or form is seen by the eye, flavour is grasped by the tongue, odour is smelt by the nose, touch is cognised by the skin, and the sound or word is heard by the ear. All these are the cases of perception. But they are the cases of sense-perception. The experience of pleasure, etc., generated by mind is mental percep
tion.
The above-mentioned perceptions are called empirical perception. Each of them-the sense-perceptions and mental perception-passes through four gradual stages, viz., avagraha (grasping), ihā (cogitation), avaya (definite judgement) and dharaṇā (retention). First there arises the general non-detailed knowledge of the object through sense-organs and mind. It is called avagraha (grasping). Then there takes place cogitation with respect to the very object with a view to arriving at definite judgement. This cogitation is called ihā. It is followed by the definite judgement called avāya. The consolidation or continuance of the judgement to such an extent that in future it may cause memory is a case of dharaṇā.
Seeing a tall thing like a tree from a distance is avagraha (grasping). This is followed by a query or doubt: 'Is this a man or a stump of a tree?'the doubt which urges the cogniser to cogitate on the basis of specific features in order to arrive at a definite judgement. This cogitation is a case
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