Gandharavada

Author(s): Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha

Page 50

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does not exist we only mean that the horn does not exist on the ass, but it does exist on a cow, etc.. We negate the jīva when we say non-jiva; therefore the counter-entity of non-jiva, viz. the jīva must be an existent entity. The rule is that if an entity denoted by an etymologically derived, uncompounded word is negated, this negation always implies the existence of the counter-entity. Jiva which can be etymologically derived and is uncompounded is negated by non-jīva; so there must be a real entity called the jīva. Not so Dittha (which cannot be etymologically explained) and khara-vişāņa (ass's horn, which is a compound). A word which is etymologically derivable and is uncompounded must refer to a real thing. 'Jiva' is one such word; so the entity ‘jiva' (soul) denoted by it must be an existent one. “Jiva' (soul) and 'deha' (body) have different sets of synonyms, and so must be distinct entities. Again, what is non-existent is not negated. If we negate the soul, it must be an existent entity. The soul cannot exist without a support; it is very easily seen that the body is this substratum, for we have marks of its residence in the body, viz. knowledge etc..
The Vedic passage 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyaḥ...' should not be interpreted to mean that sentiency perishes with the body. Vijñāna in this passage means particular knowledge which is a sum total of jñāna (determinate knowledge), and darśana (indeterminate intuition). The soul is non-different from this vijñāna and being permeated by it, is called vijñāna-ghana. 'Eva' stresses that this is the very nature of the soul, otherwise it would not be inherently sentient, as happens in the case of the soul in the Nyaya-Vaišeşika. Particular knowledge (vijñāna) arises from the bhūtas (objects like jar, cloth, etc. which have assumed the form of knowables). These vijñānas are different modes of the jīva (soul) and hence it can be said that the jīva arises out of the knowables. When these objects are no longer perceived (on account of their being covered by something or on account of absent-mindedness, etc.) this particular knowledge does not arise; or when we leaving one object concentrate on another, that particular knowledge can G-6