Book Title: Gandharavada
Author(s): Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha

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Page 217
________________ 128 would not be possible. This is true of all things. The Nihilist, again, cannot argue that he himself does not accept the notions of itself', 'other', etc, but he utilises them because they are accepted by his rival thinker; - that he speaks of them only from the opponent's point of view. The Nihilist forgets that for him there is nothing like one's own view and another's; and if he accepts this, he should give up his stand regarding Nihilism (1709). Vyakta has argued that nothing has existence, there is merely the void and that our empirical knowledge of 'long', 'short', etc. arises only relatively. A thing is called 'long' or 'short' only when it is referred to another. Now, do the two cognitions of 'long', 'short' occur simultaneously or one after the other? If simultaneously, the two cognisables appear in their own knowledge independently and one could not possibly depend on the other. If they take place one after the other, the index finger, to take an instance, has appeared as 'short' in its own cognition which occurs first and so does not need to depend on the other cognition, viz. of the middle finger as 'long'. And to cut the matter short, can you point out anything on which the very first cognition of a newly born child as it opens its eyes depends? And if two objects are alike in all respects like the two eyes and if they are cognised simultaneously, they appear in their own nature in their own cognitions and no mutual dependence of these two cognitions could be thought of. The fact is that objects appear in their Own nature in their respective cognitions without reference to another; and at a later stage when we have the curiosity to inquire into the details regarding form, etc. we are helped by auxiliary factors like the memory of their pratipaksa (opposite) and thus by a synthesis we speak of the object as 'long' or 'short'. But all things are existent in their own right -are self-established (1710-1711). If, as Vyakta says, there is sheer Nihilism, all objects are equal in being unreal. In that case why has he to explain the knowledge 'long' with regard to the middle finger by referring Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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