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modes, similar or dissimilar are originated or are destroyed every moment, wbile its basic substance remains the same. One and the same thing does not remain the same in the next moment, but becomes different. Thus if a thing cannot remain similar to itself, one cannot think of its similarity to other things; and still a thing cannot be looked upon as absolutely dissimilar from all the other things in the world for there are certain universal attributes, existence, etc. which are common to all. Thus if a thing is similar to all the other things in the world, there can be no doubt whatsoever as regards the similarity, on account of these common attributes, of a thing to its previous conditions. But no absolute stand-point can be maintained. Nothing is absolutely similar or dissimilar to itself or other things in this worldly existence or another. Every thing is similar-cum-dissimilar, eternal-cum-non-eternal and so. Hence similarity alone in the other-worldly existence should not be insisted upon by Sudharmă or any one (1794-6).
A youth has no similarity to his own condition in childhood or old age, i. e. is not absolutely similar to himself by virtue of the past modes of childhood and the future modes of old age, even though there is nothing in the world to which he is not similar in respect of such common modes as existence, etc.. Thus the soul in another worldly life is similar-cumdissimilar to everything including itself, and it is no use insisting that the soul is absolutely similar to itself alone as it was in the previous worldly existence (1797).
To explain this point further, suppose a human being dies and is reborn a god. He is then similar to all the three worlds in respect of the common modes, existence, etc. but by his modes of godhead, etc. is dissimilar to them as he is to himself as he was in the previous worldly existence. Thus there cannot be absolute similarity anywhere. Similarly a thing is eternal as the basic substance, but non-eternal on account of the modes, and so on. Sudharmā may argue that. he did not insist on similarity in all respects in the otherworldly existence, but only in respect of birth; e. g. a man dies
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