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genus of a thing cannot be transformed into one just the opposite of it. The universal 'jivatva' is as natural to the soul as are the universals 'substance' (dravyatva) and incorporeality (amurtatva). The soul cannot become adravya from being dravya or mūrta from being amūrta; so the soul cannot become ajīva from being jiva. To take an instance, ‘ajivatva' is the universal natural to 'jīva', so the soul-jiva can never become ajīva. As stated above, Mahāvīra posed the contingency of jiva becoming ajiva only to one who tried to show that the emancipated soul if devoid of sense-organs should be non-knower; if so, it should be ajīva also. But in fact, the reason 'not having sense-organs' does not imply that the emancipated soul is ajiva. Universal concomitance (vyāpti) does not hold good in the case of this hetu (reason). The cause-effect relation and the relation of invariable concomitance, that is to say, of vyāpya (less-extensive, determinate concomitant) and vyā pa ka (determinant concomitant) can determine vyapti. If jivatva were the effect of sense-organs, then it could be said that jīvatva cannot exist in the absence of sense-organs as smoke is not found in the absence of fire, which is its cause. But jivatva being a beginningless endless entity capable of transformation, is uncaused and is not the effect of any cause. Hence the absence of sense-organs cannot determine absence of jīvatva. Again if jivatva were the determinate concomitant of sense-organs, the determinant concomitant, as simšapā is of věkşatva (treeness), then it could be said that jīvatva does not exist in the absence of the sense-organs, as simšapā is not existent when treeness is not there. But this relation does not exist at all between jiva and sense-organs because they are entirely different; the jīva is incorporeal and sentient, while the sense-organs are corporeal and constituted of matter. Sense-organs have this relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpya-vyāpa kabhāva) with body, since both are material. Hence it is not true to say that the emancipated soul becomes non-soul when there is no sense-organ. It remains a soul (1993-4).
The emancipated soul may remain a jīva, but the original question as to how this soul could cognise or know in the
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