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(iv) Pleasure and pain which are effects do not occur simultaneously, so they must have separate causes; these are punya and pāpa which are therefore independent entities.
(v) There is nothing like pāpa or punya; the manifold worldly existence goes on by its own essential nature (svabhāva). . Of these the fourth view alone recognising the independent existence of punya and păpa stands to reason; the others are faulty and can be sublated by reasoning. Svabhāva, to take the view mentioned last, cannot explain the existence of pleasure and pain in all their variety. What is this Svabhāva ? Is it a thing or non-causality or attribute of a thing.* Svabhāva cannot be recognised as a thing because it is not apprehended like sky-flower (1912–3).
Andt if its existence is recognised even when it is not apprehended, then there should be no objection to recognising the existence of karma of the form of punya-păpa. Whatever reason is put forth to account for svabhāva even though it is not apprehended the same will be the reason for the existence of karma (1914). . Or there is no harın in regarding svabhāva as but another name for karman. I Moreover, syabhāva being uniform in nature, cannot give rise to the manifold effects like body, etc. which have a fixed shape. The potter cannot make jars of a specific shape without the help of his manifold apparatus; so the variety of pleasurepain cannot arise without manifold karma; svabháva, uniform in character, cannot be regarded as their cause (1915).
Again, if this syabhāvas is a thing is it corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it would differ only in name from
* Same as Gātha 1786. For the refutation of Svabhāvavada, see Gathā 1643 commentary.
+ Same as Găthá 1787
Same as 1788 ab.
$ The same questions have been raised in Gáthás 1789-90 but answered differently. And we have the same discussion as we have here in the commentary on Gātha 1643.
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