Book Title: Gandharavada
Author(s): Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha

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Page 224
________________ 135 could be obtained from the causal complement in the form of sky-flower. But this is not what we find; our experience is that an effect arises from a particular thing alone as the cause and this cannot be true if Nihilism is accepted (1736). Moreover there is no invariable rule that everything must be produced out of the causal complement. Bodies of binaries, etc. having space-points are made of two or more atoms; but the atom is devoid of space-point and so is not produced by anything and yet it is existent as can be inferred from its effect as the linga (mark). It has been said : The atom can be inferred from corporeal things; it is without space-point, it is the final cause, is eternal, las one taste, one colour, one odour and two kinds of touch. If can be inferred from its effect (mūrtair aņur apradeśaḥ kā raram antyam bhavet tathā pityah; ekarasa-varņa-gandlio dvisparśaḥ kārya-lingaś ca). If even the atom is regarded as having space-point we will have to go still backwards, but will have to stop somewhere and that will be the atom. But even that will contradict the supposed rule that everything is produced by the causal apparatus (1737). If Vyakta says that the atoms do not exist at all as they are not produced by the complement of causal factors, then it means that Vyakta is contradicting himself as he himself has previously said that everything is observed to be produced by the complement of causal factors, and the existence of these could not be explained in the absence of atoms. That would be as self-contradictory as saying, 'All statements are false'. Moreover if atoms do not exist, should the world of effects be explained as produced out of sky-flowers ? Therefore if it is believed that everything is produced out of the causal apparatus, atoms must exist (1738). As to the argument that the hind part of a thing is not seen, only its fore-part is seen and so on* leading to Nihilism, there is contradiction even here, for it is admitted that the fore-part is cognised and yet upheld that it does not * See Gathā 1696. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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