Book Title: Gandharavada
Author(s): Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha

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Page 218
________________ 129 to short objects like the index finger, etc. Why cannot a thing be called 'long with reference to a long object, or even a sky-flower when everything is equally unreal and non-existent; or why by referring things to a sky-flower do we not call things ‘long' or 'short'? But this is not found to be the case. So Nihilism cannot be accepted and reality of things has to be admitted (1712). If Nihilism be accepted, even the concept of relativity should not be accepted as it is not consistent with the fundamental doctrine of Nihilism. It cannot be asserted that it is the very nature of things to be called relatively 'short' or 'long' and nature (svabhāva) cannot be questioned. Who is to be questioned as to why fire burns and not ether (agnir dahati nákāśam k'otra paryanuyujyatām)? If the Nihilist were to put forth this argument, his case would be doomed. Nature or svabháva is one's own existence or character. Here there is distinction between itself and another and this militates against the doctrine of Nihilism. Moreover if everything were unreal, would it be possible to discuss and argue in terms of one's own nature (svabhāva)? Can you ever imagine the essential nature of the 'barren woman's son' or of any such thing utterly non-existent? Only existent things can have syabhāva, their own nature. Thus Nihilism stands refuted (1713). Mahāvīra himself is not against relativity as such. We may know .things as, or call them, “short' or 'long'. But the very existence of things does not depend on anything. And the qualities of things e. g. colour, form, taste, etc. too as distinct from the relative ones -- 'shortness', 'longness', etc. are selfestablished, not relative. The existence of these does not depend on anything and hence they cannot be regarded as non-existent. Hence the doctrine of Nihilism cannot be upheld (1714). :: Were even existence, etc. relative, the long thing itself would perish if the 'short' did not exist. But this is not what. we find; the thing would exist even then, only it would not be called 'long'. This shows that existence, colour and such 17 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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