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We may pursue this inquiry differently. Is the thing possessing the attributes identical with them or different from them? If it is identical, it follows that the jiva should be immediately apprehended by the apprehension of its qualitiesknowledge, etc., just as if colour is identical with cloth, this latter is automatically. cognised when the colour is cognised. If the thing possessing the qualities is different from them, then it is true that it will not be perceived even when the qualities are perceived. But this will apply to all objects. Jar, etc. too will not be perceived even when their qualities are perceived. In that case it is not necessary to isolate the soul for a special treatment and say that it does not exist. It cannot also be said that the soul does not exist because it is not perceived, while the jar exists because it is perceived (Gāthā 1549). The existence of the jar will have to be first established before this could be said. If it is argued that the thing and its qualities are different, but the qualities cannot remain without it, therefore the perception of colour, etc. establishes the existence of the jar, - then the qualities memory, etc. too cannot remain without their substratum. The apprehension of memory, etc. establishes thus the existence of the soul of which they are the attributes. Thus the existence of the soul has to be recognised even though it is not accepted that the soul is perceptible and identical with the qualities. It may be argued that it may be accepted that the qualities knowledge, etc. have a substratum, but it does not follow that it is the soul; body can be the substratum because like leanness, stoutness, etc. knowledge etc. are found in it. The rejoinder to this is that knowledge, etc. cannot possibly be qualities of the body, because it is corporeal and visible like the jar; and yet qualities cannot reside without an appropriate substratum - a substance. The substratum which to be worthy of the qualities knowledge etc., is non-corporeal and invisible is the jiva or the soul which exists over and above the body. It cannot be urged that perception tells us that the qualities, knowledge, etc. reside in the body, because this is contradicted by inference: The knower is different from the senses, because even when they do not operațe, there is the remembrance of what has been cognised
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