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subject of this inference – viz. Other cognitions and their objects — has not been established. What is the sense in discussing the attributes (momentariness, etc.) of things the very existence of which is a matter of doubt. The one momentary cognition having but one object cannot do this work, viz, establish that there are other cognitions, they have their own objects and these objects have their attributes — capability of producing knowledge about themselves, etc.. How can cognition tell us of the momentariness of these, when they themselves are not known. It may again be urged that inference from itself and its object can establish all this: "Just as I am, 80 other cognitions also exist; just as my objects exist, so also the objects of other cognitions; and as I and my object are momentary, so other cognitions and their objects are momentary.” But this, too, is not correct. The knowledge cognising the momentariness of all these is inomentary; it perishes as soon as it originates; it cannot, therefore, cognise its own destruction and momentariness - much less can it cognise other cognitions, their objects and the momentariness of all these. Moreover, it cannot cognise the momentariness even of its own object, because the cognition and its object perish simultaneously. Should the cognition perish after having seen its object perish and having ascertained its momentariness, then this could be possible. But both perish simultaneously after having given rise to their respective point-instants. Perception of the nature of self-consciousness (sva-samvedana) or sensuous perception cannot cognise momentariness in the Buddhist view and that inference cannot help in this direction has been shown above. So momentariness of things cannot be established (1676).
... It cannot also be argued that the previous cognition creates such an impression on the succeeding one that cognition though momentary and of one object, can know the attributes (existence, momentariness, etc.) of other cognitions and of their objects. This is possible only if the impressor-cognition and the cognition impressed upon meet in one moment and not when a cognition perishes as soon as it is born. If, to avoid this difficulty,
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