Book Title: Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): J C Sikdar
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi

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Page 155
________________ 120 The Conception of Matter in Jaina Philosophy negation of dissolution (pralaya) because of there being permanent activity in it. If the non-active nature of ult mate atom is accepted, there will come up the question of negation of creation because of there being permanent inactivity in it. If both the active and non-active natures of ultimate atom are accepted, it cannot be possible simultaneously, for both are contradictory to each other. If neither of them (neither active nor non-active nature of ultimate atoms) is accepted, some operative cause must be admitted, i. e. their activity or nonactivity would depend upon an operative cause. And if Adrsta is admitted as the operative cause, the activity will be permanent because of Adrsta being in permanent proximity to atoms. If it is said that Adrsta is not the operative cause, there will be permanent non-activity. For this reason paramāņukāraņavāda (doctrine of ultimate) as cause is untenable. "The Vaisesika assumes that when substances are broken up into parts, a limit is reached beyond which the process of breaking up cannot be continued. The atoms are the limit. They belong to four classes, and are eternal and possess the qualities like colour, etc. These are the originating principles out of which this material universe of colour, form, etc. is constituted. In reply to this Vaiśesika view Ācārya Sankara opines that if atoms have colour, etc , then they are gross and non-permanent. It is found from the daily experience that the things possessing colour, etc., are compared to their causes, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth is gross when compared to the threads of which it is made and non-permanent; so the threads are gross compared to the filaments of which they are made. So the atoms possessing colour must be gross and non-enternal compared to their causes. So the Vaisesika sūtra “That which exists without having a cause is external”2 does not apply to atoms. Secondly, the reason, which the Vaišeșika gives for the performance of atoms that “if, as 1. ŚBha. on BS., II. 2-14 Nityameva ca bhāvāt. 2. Sadakāraṇavannityam, VS., VI. 1.1. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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