Book Title: Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): J C Sikdar
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi

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Page 375
________________ CONCLUSION Value of the Jaina Conception of Matter A study of the Jaina conception of Matter reveals that it was natural for the Jainācāryas to begin their metaphysical inquiry to the problem with the notion of Dravya (substance), a notion which has a continuous history in Jaina Philosophy from its very beginning up to the present time as is found in the case of notion of substance from Aristotle to Descartes. The Jainas had developed the distinction between Dravya and its gunas (attributes) partly in order to mark logical difference between the ultimate subjects of knowledge and partly also to answer puzzles about change and identity. The next step is to divide gunas of Dravya or guņas which it may be said to possess into two categories: first, the essential attributes, those which make it the kind of thing it is, and. secondly, the accidental attributes, which it may acquire and lose without changing its essential nature.1 "In Spinoza's terminology the words 'necessary and contingent' are generally substituted for 'essential and accidental."""2 The Jaina concept of Dravya is comparable with the concept. of substance of Spinoza, the central theme of his metaphysics. "A substance, all of whose attributes and modifications can be deduced from its own essential nature, and all whose attributes are therefore necessary and not contingent, can be described as cause of itself, (causa sui) and only such a substance can be so described. It is Spinoza's fundamental argument in part I of 1. Sarvarthasiddhi, Pujyapada, p. 136; Tattvartha Rajavārtika, p. 502; Tattvartha Slokavārtika, ch. V. 41, p. 446; TS., Bha, Ch. V, p. 435. 2. Spinoza, Stuart Hampshire, A Pelican Book, p. 32. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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