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The Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy
of things constitute ignorance (avidyā)"1 on account of which they are not perceived, hence, they are eternal, or as one cannot conceive any other cause of the decay of an object than the disjunction or destruction of its cause, so it is taken for granted that the last causes must be external. Therefore, these eternal things, the causes of the non-eternal ones, are atoms, but they are intangible to the senses, for only the great thing is perceptible in case it possesses many constituent parts and presupposes colour.? Atom is indivisible, as it is not composed of material parts. S
An object is great, if it is constituted of many constituent parts or if the parts themselves are great, or if they are adjus. ted in a particular way.4 The opposite to Mahat (great thing) is aņu (small thing) which is not composed of constituent parts, i. e. atom.
The statement “Great, small, long and short”, as popularly used are relative terms, for the same object is great with reference to one object and small in relation to another. These points to great objects because they are visible; there they are applied in a secondary sense. But the expressions 'great' and 'small' are not relative terms in the primary sense, but they signify distinct kinds or general of dimension like red and
Rūpādināṁ kāraṇe sadbhāvāt kārye sadbhāvaḥ kāraṇaguņapūrvaka hi kāryaguna bhavanti ghatapatādau tathā darśanādityarthaḥ (comm). 4. 1. 3;
Anitya iti višeşataḥ pratişedhabhāvaḥ, Ibid., IV. 1. 4. 1. Avidyā-VS., IV. 1. 5;
Paramāņoranityavişayā sarväpyanunitiḥ avidyā bhrama
rūpā ābhāsaprabhavatvāt, (comm,) 4. 1. 5. 2. Mahatyanekadravyavattāt rūpāccopalabdl iḥ, VS., IV. 1. 6. 3. Nyāyavārtika, p. 233. 4. Karañabahutvācca, VS. VII. 1. 9;
Mahattvadırghatva-parimāņayogābhyupagamāt-ŚBhā on
AS., II. 2. 11. 5. Ato viparItamaņu, VS., 7. 1. 10;
Etena dirghattvahrasvatve vyākhyāte, VS., 7. 1. 17.
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