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The Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy
erroneous according to these cause in general and that recognition in the case of the baked one in particular is more vitiated by prejudice than logic.1
308
The Vaisesikas opine that the advocate of the theory of Pitharapakaja accepts the possibility of the recognition of the sameness of magnitude and shape in the case of a slightly mutilated pot, e. g. a pot perforated in the neck with a needle is recognized to be the same pot even though mutilated, but logically it cannot be the same original whole pot, as it is lost of a part, though small. The whole exists in the totality of the parts and cannot dispense with any of these parts without losing its identity. If the whole is deprived of one or two parts, it ceases to exist and another whole deprived of parts emerges.
In reply to this argument the Mimāṁsakas argue that "the loss of one or two parts does not entail the disappearance of the whole as the recognition of identity proves its continuance in the parts that are left over.""
The Vaiseṣikas refute this point by explaining that a whole which exists in a determinate number of parts cannot continue to exist in excision or accretion of part of a two in it. The MImāṁsaka example of diminution of magnitude of a piece of cloth due to contraction does not suggest the substraction of parts or its expansions; a fresh accession of parts does not fit
1. NP., p. 311. 2. KV., p. 188;
Rupam caśrayanāśādeva vinaśyati, kāryarūpatvāt nastaghaṭarupavādi (1) tyasyapi pratyayasya pratyabhijñānirdalitatvāt,...pitharavayavānāṁ tatha tanmadhyapatitadvyaņukasyāpi kā jIvitavyavasthitivatyanumānamapyudyamāsā dayati, NLV., pp. 831-2;
VSU., VII. 1. 6. KR., p. 60
3. The MImaṁsakas appear to be the earliest exponents of the doctrine of Pitharapaka.
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