Sambodhi 1984 Vol 13 and 14

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 11

Y. S. Shastri
Again, the very statement that Müyà is indescribable i.e. neither existent nor non-existent on account of being existent in the state of mundane life and no more at the state of realisation, indicates that it is describable in terms of either existent on the phenomenal level or non-existent in the state of liberation.49 To say that Maya is indescribable, is self contradictory like saying that I am silent throughout the life and my father is bachelor. 50
If we grunt that Maya exists, then where does it exist ? Neither Braliman nor jiva can be locus of Maya. It cannot exist in the supreme Brahman which is pureconsciousness by nature. If it exists in Brahman, then Brahman cannot be called pureconsciousness on account of being associated with Maya. Even individual self is pureconsciousness by nature and in essence, not different from Brahman and thus free from all taint of Milya. If Maya is an independent reality like Brahman and co-eval with it from the beginningless time, then it will be an impossible task to annihilate it by any means of liberation and the consequence of this indestructibility of Maya is an eternal bondage of the soul. 51 It is argued that Māya exists (Bhavarípa) but it cannot be eternal like Brahman nor cannot be an independent entity. Though it is not capable of being deterinined by logic, still the denial of its existence would be contradiction of a selt fact and without adopting this doctrine of Maya it is not possible to solve the problem of relation between the Absolute and phenomena, individual self and the Brahman, real and the unreal. 5 2 Here, again, one may argue why should such kind of illogical and irrational concept be accepted at all ? Instead of postulating this kind of unreal principle as the cause of the world, it is better to accept the view that the world is both different as well non-different from the Brahman. The relation between the Absolute and the world is to be identity-cunt-difference. An advantage of accepting this view is that there is no necessity of denying any one of the felt facts-the world and its cause-the Absolute. 5 3
Again, the unreality of the world cannot be proved. Argument of the vedantins is that real is real always, remains constant at all the times and is free from origin and destruction, increase and decrease. But things of the world are subject to constant change, decay and death. Thus they are unreal. This Vedāntic position can be put in the following syllogistic form; "world is unreal, because it is an apparent reality, that which is apparent is unreal (as for instance) silver on a shall, therefore, this world is unreal because of its apparent nature. 54 This word, "unreality" of the